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or over ten years, Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary 
Putnam have engaged with M. F. Burnyeat in a di­
alectic battle over issues surrounding Aristotle's the­
ory of perception. Putnam and Nussbaum argue for 
11 a defense of the Aristotelian form-matter view as a happy 
alternative to material reductionism on the one hand, Cartesian 
dualism on the other-an alternative that has certain similarities 
with contemporary functionalism."l Burnyeat argues that the 
Putnam/Nussbaum conclusions are false because they fail to 
realize that the Aristotelian side of body/soul dualism is not 
compatible with modern functionalism.2 Burnyeat also proposes, 
as an alternative to the Putnam/Nussbaum argument, a rival 
interpretation, which he suggests is held by John Philoponus, 
Thomas Aquinas and Franz Brentano.3 Putnam and Nussbaum 
respond by suggesting "how even the greatest Christian inter­
preter of Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, was led by philosophy 
and theodicy together to reject Burnyeat's 'Christian interpreta­
tion' and to adopt one that is very close to ours.,,4 
Two Fundamental Questions 
Within this discussion, two major questions must be asked: 
1) What does Aristotle mean when he says that in percep­
tion, the sense-organ becomes like the thing perceived, is 
potentially such as the thing perceived is already, and 
receives the form of the thing without matter? 
2) On the Burnyeat and Putnam/Nussbaum interpreta­
tions how is the esse naturale linked with the esse inten­
tionale? 
This is important in determining which view is correct, 
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because an adequate interpretation must be compatible with the 
well known Thomistic axiom borrowed from Aristotle, sensus in 
actu est sensibile in actu; i.e., the sense-faculty in operation is 
identical with the sense-object in action. Burnyeat argues that 
Aristotle's concept of the esse naturale is false and outdated; 
therefore Aristotle must be /I junked." Putnam and Nussbaum 
. argue that there need be no intentionality in esse intentionale and 
that there can still be an identity between matter and form. In this 
paper, I will present the arguments of Putnam and Nussbaum, 
together with Burnyeat's response.5 In conclusion, I suggest that 
neither the Burnyeat interpretation, nor the Putnam/Nussbaum 
account is correct. We must opt for a "middle ground" between 
the two analyses. 
Burllyeai's Analysis 
Burnyeat states that Putnam and Nussbaum claim that 
because Aristotle /I explains the relation of soul to body as a 
special case of the relation of form or function to the matter in 
which it is realized," he is a functionalist.6 Based on this function­
alist framework, Putnam argues that humans are probabilistic 
automatons.' What Putnam and Nussbaum claim is that for 
perception to take place, it is not necessary that there be a 
particular set of physical and psychological limitations, although 
there must be some sort. In order to demonstrate this, Putnam and 
Nussbaum utilize an account of Aristotle's theory of perception 
proposed by Richard Sorabji. The Sorabji account addresses ques­
tion number one: What does Aristotle mean when he says that 
the sense organ becomes like the thing perceived? 
Sorabji's interpretation of Aristotle's 1/ taking on form 
without matter" is that" the organ of sense quite literally takes on 
the color or smell perceived."B Sorabji's interpretation allows 
perception to occur without any particular physical set-up. He 
believes that what Aristotle means by perception is that when the 
eye sees something red, the /I eye jelly" actually turns red; when 
you smell something, your nose turns "smelly." 
Burnyeat's second response to this interpretation is his 
strongest.
9 
He points out that Aristotle goes to great lengths to tell 
us that during perception the following occur: 
1) The being is affected by the sensible object; 
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2) This change is a very special one; and 
3) It is not a substantial change (in other words, it is a change 
in accidental jorm).10 
These changes, Aristotle claims, are II actualization of a 
potentiality"; perception, on the other hand, is not like this. To 
illustrate what this change is, Aristotle provides the following 
example. Consider these three cases: 
1) A man who has the capacity to learn grammar but has 
not yet done so; 
2) A man who has learned grammar; and 
3) A man who has learned grammar and is currently 
using it. 
A green apple becoming red, is going from (1) to (2); a 
potentiality becomes actual. This is a qualitative change, the type 
of change 50rabji claims Aristotle refers to. The change involved 
in perception however, is like the transition from (2) to (3); this is 
a quantitative change. This is Burnyeat's claim. We already pos­
sess the capacity to perceive. Actually perceiving is our ability to 
use that capacity. The sense organ is not changed, it is realized. 
Burnyeat takes the above Aristotelian grammatical expla­
nation to reject the 50rabji view.lI For Aristotle, the 1/ causal 
agent" of the spedal change is the actual color or smell which is 
being perceived, not the perceiver.12 On that note, I too believe 
we can dismiss the 50rabji interpretation. I do not claim that 
Burnyeat is correct; however I think his analysis has demon­
strated clearly that what Aristotle meant by /I taking on form 
without matter" is not that the /I eye jelly" turns red. 
The question now changes for Bumyeat; if what produces 
the perception of red or of middle C is red or middle C, how do 
we have an awareness of it?13 What Aristotle says here is that the 
sense organ must be natured; i.e., it must be "ready to take on" the 
sensible object, like the object of perception must be actual. 
Aristotle argues that the organ of touch, the hand or foot, must be 
in a mean state in respect to sensible opposites like hot and cold.H 
In contrast, Putnam and Nussbaum argue that being "natured" is 
not enough; there must be some physical change, such as 
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Sorabji's "the eye becoming red." They stress that the esse inten­
tionale is not as important as previously suggested, but rather, the 
esse naturale is. 111ey claim tha~ an id~ntity ~etwe~n th~ o~iect ~n~ 
the perceiver's concept is possIble wIthout mtentlOnahty. ThIs IS 
what the functionalist position allows, and this is why it is 
needed for their argument to hold philosophically. Without func­
tionalism, the esse naturale will not provide the sufficient justifica­
tion it needs to for their claims: therefore, the esse intentionale will 
be invaluable. This principle is not compatible with their argu­
ment. 
According to Burnyeat, what Aristotle argues is that t,he 
hand must be of a certain hardness or softness in order to 
perceive something. If your hand were as hard as the surface it 
was feeling, you would not notice that it was hard. This problem 
does not exist for other sense capacities; for example, the eye is 
"colorless" and the ears are "soundless." Therefore, we have a 
neutral medium to receive visual and auditory signals. The hand 
cannot be "feel-less" or absent of temperature, nor to some 
degree hard or soft. Therefore, we might not have any contrast 
between the perceiver and the object. Here, Burnyeat points out 
that the Sorabji interpretation must distinguish between the hand 
and the internal organ of touch, which Aristotle, in these texts, 
does not appear to do.16 
According to Burnyeat, we are therefore forced to con­
clude that the organ actually becoming like the object is not a 
literal change (e.g., the hand becoming warm), but noticing or 
realizing, or becoming aware of the warmth. What Aristotle 
suggests here appears similar to what Aquinas calls a "spiritual 
change/' a becoming aware of a sensible quality in the world.17 In 
other worlds, it is not an actual change, rather, an intentional one. 
The Putnam/Nussbaum Response 
Before discussing that issue, I must first entertain the 
objections to Burnyeat's conclusions proposed by Putnam and 
Nussbaum. The first point they raise is that Burnyeat's analysis 
rests on evidence obtained from De Anima alone, and while this is 
a major text, it is not sufficient to consider as the central text.18 
Putnam and Nussbaum next discuss perception and the 
relationship between perceiving and desiring which results in 
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animal movement. This is key for the functional interpretation of 
Aristotle. They start their analysis in chapter seven of De Moto by 
stating several questions and answers that Aristotle ponders in 
attempting to reach a conclusion about perception. Aristotle is 
interested in why, when an animal knows or realizes an object, 
the realization is followed by a bodily movement. He answers his 
own question by referring to desire, which sometimes, to be 
fulfilled by an animal, requires movement. The question that 
follows for Aristotle, is how can a mental process actually set a 
physical process in motion? Aristotle again answers his own 
question in that these processes are, in themselves, functions of 
the body. It is only natural for these processes to cause bodily 
movements. Putnam and Nussbaum contend that such changes 
permanently cOl~oin perception and other forms of cognitionJ 
including desire. 9 However, this is not evidence yet for a com­
plete material change, which Putnam and Nussbaum must 
demonstrate if their thesis is to hold. It is, however, foreshadow­
ing the path they will take to accomplish this. This complements 
their overall intentions because it demonstrates that, according to 
Aristotle, animal movement and perception denote a type of 
function.20 
Puhmm and Nussbaum conclude, "De Moto provides 
very powerful evidence that Aristotle conceives of both perceiv­
ing and desiring as thoroughly enmattered. Their activity is 
accompanied, of necessity, by a transition in matter.,,21 This, they 
say, indiscriminately shows that there is a necessary material 
change in perception but not necessarily a particular change. 
Therefore, the artifact model holds. 
Is Aristotle a Functionalist? 
Like Burnyeat, I see serious problems with this conclu­
sion. The functionalist claims that there is no necessary connec­
tion between a psychological state and its material realization. 
While there might be a change, it is not a particular change. I 
suggest that if we refer to Aristotle's concept of sight, touch, taste 
and smell, the functionalist position seems unlikely. As Aristotle 
argues, there must be a medium in order for perception to occur. 
For sight, the eye must be "clear" and the space between the 
object and the knower unobstructed; for hearing, there must be 
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air "walled" up in the ear; for taste, the taste buds must be 
"clear"; and for touch, the hand must be in a /I medium state of 
temperature." How can one claim that these are not particular 
necessary conditions; they certainly are! The functionalist inter­
pretation holds that perception can occur in any state. Aristotle 
plainly argues that this is not true. Rather, there are ve~ specific 
conditions for the eye to see, the ear to hear, and so on. 2 On that 
note, it is necessary to discuss: 
1) Burnyeat's alternative theory of perception, that held 
primarily by John Philoponus, Thomas Aquinas, and 
Franz Brentano; and 
2) T?: objections raised by Putnam and Nussbaum to this 
posltion. 
According to Burnyeat, Philoponus, Aquinas, and 
Brentano believe that during perception, the eye merely becomes 
/I aware" of the color, rather than the eye literally becoming red. If 
the Sorabji position holds, then the being affected is the nose, 
which turns "smelly," or the eye, which turns red. If the 
Thomistic theory of intentionality is true, then the being affected 
is already in a cognate state: it is aware of the color, or smell, it is 
"natured." What, then, is the point to asking what more there is 
to perceivingi it is nothing more than becoming aware of a 
senSI'ble qua I'lty.24 
In order to illustrate why the alternative theory holds and 
the Putnam/Nussbaum/Sorabji one does not, Burnyeat turns to 
De Anima (2.12). Here he seeks to answer the question of why 
Aristotle's biggest statement about his theory of perception is 
illustrated by using Plato's model of the wax block. In doing this, 
Aristotle objects to Plato and suggests that perception is aware­
ness, "articulated awareness, from the start."25 In other words, 
Plato thought that cognitive life could only be explained in terms 
of a thinking soul; Aristotle, on the other hand, holds that all that 
is necessary is five separate senses. By using the wax model, 
Aristotle also substantiates the two claims that Burnyeat makes. 
The first claim is that the"reception of sensible forms is to 
be understood in terms of becoming aware of colors, sounds, 
smells, and other sensible qualities, not just a physiological 
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change in the quality of the organ."26 For example, if I mark some 
wax with a circular ring, the wax does not become circular; rather 
it takes on and displays a circle. The circle is not displayed of the 
wax but rather in it. The second claim is that "no physiological 
change is needed for the eye or the organ of touch to become 
aware of the appropriate perceptual objects.//27 This means the 
effect on the perceiver is the awareness, nothing else.28 It is this 
claim that seems to be in opposition to the Putnam/Nussbaum 
thesis because it means that in one sense, an animal's capacity to 
perceive does not require any explanation.29 
A Second PutnamfNussbaum Response 
Putnam and Nussbaum now responded to Burnyeat's 
claims.30 They begin by referring to De Anima (2.1, 412b 4-25), 
where they make the following point: Because the soul is the first 
actuality of the body, it is not appropriate to ask whether or not 
the body and the soul are one. To illustrate this, Aristotle refers to 
the wax model, where he claims it is also not appropriate to 
inquire whether the wax and the shape are one. 
According to Burnyeat's reading, the relationship be­
tween the body and the soul is not one like that of the wax and its 
shape. Matter is the necessary causal condition for perception to 
occur; matter, therefore, merely supplies the means, but is /lot the 
end.31 Putnam and Nussbaum however, state that the wax model 
is IIapt.// Aristotle's objection to asking whether the body and 
soul are one, is justified. liThe soul is not a thing merely housed in 
the body; its doings are the doings of body... the only thing there 
is, is one natural thing.// 32 What this all means in response to 
Bumyeat is the following: 
1) Perception and desire are mentioned by Aristotle, in De 
Sensu I, to be activities of the soul that are known or 
perceived in some type of material set-up. 
2) Whatever this material set-up may be, it is not com­
pletely independent. Furthermore, while this may be ex­
plored, as Aristotle himself does in De Moto and the Parva 
Naturalia, one must make sure not to slip into conclusions 
of total reductionism for a complete explanation. 
3) What Putnam and Nussbaum suggest is that even the 
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greatest Christian interpreter of Aristotle, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, was actually led to dismiss the view that 
Burnyeat thinks compatible with Aristotle. Aquinas opted 
for a position more like theirs.33 
To demonstrate this, Putnam and Nussbaum offer several 
propositions that Aquinas, and any other Christian, philosophi­
cally must hold by the fact that they are Christians. If the 
Burnyeat position is true, then they cannot consciously contend 
that these conditions are possible. The committed Christian 
philosophically must accept the following propositions: 




2) If the body's capabilities are no\ wholly suited to fit 

with the functions of the sout why did God not make 

humans less arbitrary and more organic? 





If the soul is removed from the body, which it must be in 
the resurrection, and there are not necessary material conditions 
for this activity to occur, then this long awaited event will be at 
worst a "divine blunder." In fact, Putnam and Nussbaum point 
out that while Aquinas did (in his Commentary on De Anima), 
claim that the reception of form without matter was as Burnyeat 
described, he also held that for perception to occur, there are 
necessary material conditions; these changes are alterations in the 
sense organ. 34 It is difficult to determine exactly where Aquinas' 
position fits in. If there are necessary material conditions that 
result in the organ's changing, what are they? He is obviously 
not compatible with Burnyeat. Nonetheless, the Sorabji position 
is not a Thomistic one. We are left to ponder this question and I 
suggest that Putnam and Nussbaum do not offer any analysis of 
this set of issues. 
In the Summa Theologiae, (I, 75, 3), Aquinas writes, 
Aristotle insists that. ..sensing and the related oper­
ations of the sensitive soul evidently happen to­
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gether with some change of the body...and so it is 
evident that the sensitive soul has no operation 
that is proper to itself; but all the operation of the 
sensitive soul is the operation of the com­
pound...sensing is not an operation of the soul by 
. lf 35ltse . 
Putnam and Nussbaum point out that for Aquinas, human per­
ception has necessary material conditions; furthermore, thinking 
needs phantasms, and phantasms themselves are realized by 
some matter. Therefore, both thinking and perceiving are forms 
of the human body, and perception is "the act of an activity 
embodied or realized in a corporeal organ": thinking, on the 
other hand, is not.36 Putnam and Nussbaum suggest that, to this 
point they have not succeeded in disproving the alternative 
Thomistic position; they have simply shown why it is not their 
position. 
An Analysis of the PutnamfNussbaum Position 
I think it is appropriate to point out that the Putnam/ 
Nussbaum objections to Burnyeat's rival interpretation are futile 
and contain little punch. While Aquinas is certainly a Christian 
and a theologian, there is no such indication of his religion in his 
theory of perception. If we treat Aquinas as a philosopher when 
he writes on philosophical issues, we must refute his philosophi­
cal arguments with philosophical analysis, not theological ones. 
The issues are now all on the philosophical table. What 
are we to do with this? I submit the following conclusions: 
1) The Sorabji position seems unlikely. 





3) The proposed attempt to make Aristotle into a function­

alist has not been sufficiently demonstrated. 

4) Putnam and Nussbaum have not refuted Burnyeat, and 

he has not been able to do so to them. 

5) None of the interpretations considered in this analysis 

correctly link up the esse naturale and the esse intentionale: 

this appears to be a necessary condition for any solution. 
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Are we therefore forced to accept Burnyeat's conclusion 
and "junk" Aristotle? I do not think that position follows. 
Burnyeat's interpretation, I submit, pays too much attention to 
the esse naturale; he goes so far that the Aristotelian position we 
had when we began our analysis is removed. Putnam and Nuss­
baum, on the other hand, devote their time to the esse intentionale; 
yet they modify it beyond Aristotle to the point where it seems 
that the possibility of intentionality is removed from the 
knower's capacity. Sorabji is just plain wrong. 
I propose instead that we must look further for a proper 
analysis and interpretation. The resolution we seek must contain 
many parts, which, while present in parts in the above interpreta­
tions, are never united under one roof. A proper and through 
solution to Aristotle's theory of perception must contain the 
following propositions: 
1) Aristotle's /I taking on form without matter" must be 
interpreted somewhere between Burnyeat and Putnam/ 
Nussbaum/Sorabji. It cannot be a total physical transition 
like Sorabji, nor can there be no transition like Burnyeat. 
Furthermore, we cannot pay too much attention to the 
psychological transition in the capacity like Putnam and 
Nussbaum's analysis. We need a middle ground between 
the totally physical and totally mental, which appears to 
be Aristotle's position. The solution must be balanced 
between the two. 
2) The esse naturale is equally united with the esse inten­
tionale. This means that the object in nature is exactly the 
same as the perceived awareness; there must exist an 
"identity./I 
liThe doctrine of intentionality should not be treated as a 
doctrine of the similarity of forms, but as a doch'ine of the identity 
of forms." 
37 
In order for this to be possible, equal weight must be 
given to both the physical object in the world and the knowing 
capacities in the human body. The material aspects must be 
considered, along with the physiological and psychological. As 
Anthony Kenny once wrote: 
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When I think of redness, what makes my thought 
to be a thought of redness is the form of redness. 
When I think of a horse, similarly, it is the form of 
horse which makes the thought be a thought of a 
horse and not of a cow .... In the one case it has 
esse naturale, existence in nature; in the mind it has 
a different kind of existence, esse intentionale.38 
If we find a solution that contains these two main "middle 
ground" aspects, then I believe we will have found the right 
analysis. Recent attempts to manipulate Aristotelian concepts to 
fit into contemporary philosophy of mind discussions fail. As 
Aristotle himself once noted, one mistake in the beginning of an 
analysis leads to many more in the future. Aristotle is Aristotle, 
and we must not forget that. He was writing in a time very unlike 
ours, and his concepts and theories must be analyzed in terms of 
philosophical realism. He is not a modern philosopher and his 
philosophic positions must be treated as such. To find a solution 
we must first look back at what Aristotle was really discussing, 
how he was talking about it, and most of all, why he was talking 
about it. If we can answer these seemingly easy questions, we 
will be one step further in discovering how one II takes on form 
without matter." 
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they are not fatal. He cannot deny that the alloioseis is a material tran­
sition without making the entire contents of chapters 7-10 ambiguous 
to the point of hopelessness; nor can he disagree that this interpretation 
is consistent \\'ith De Allima in that perception is an energy, and Aristo­
tle's general non-reductionism in regard to animal motion. All 
Burnyeat can do here is to suggest that the material transition is not as­
sociated with all perceiving but only certain instances. 
-
~I 
Putnam and Nussbaum, 1992,41. 
22 Burnyeat's interpretation can get around this problem because he 
claims that physiological necessary conditions are only states of recep­
33 Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception 
tivity, not processes or alterations. As Marc Cohen writes "This 
clinches his case against the functionalist interpretation, Burnyeat 
thinks. For it shows that Aristotle would have to hold that an organ­
ism's perceptual capacities are fundamental, not supervenient." 
(Sorabji even agrees with this point, see 217.) I too believe that this 
clinches Bumyeat's argument against the functionalist; however, like 
Cohen, I am not claiming his rival interpretation is correct. 
23 Bumyeat, 18. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 21-2 , 
27 Ibid. 
2S Ibid. 
29 For Aristotle, the existence of life is the explanation for why we have 
the physical make-up that we have, not vice versa. The secondary qual­
ities (proper and common sensibles) are already present in the world; 
all that is needed to perceive them is the corresponding capacities to do 
so; i.e., the smell of a pig is already in the world; all we need is a nose 
to smell it. From this, he argues that we can derive conclusions about 
the organs we must have to do this; i.e. the eye must be clear and trans­
parent, and the hand must have middle ground of hot and cold to per­
ceive temperature. These are only the necessary conditions for percep­
tion to take place; they are not part of a more complex story to work up 
"from material tel111S to a set of sufficient conditions for the perception 
ofcolol's and temperature" (Bumyeat, 22). According to Aristotle'S 
view, via BUl11yeat, there is no more story to be told, whereas the func­
tionalist position asserts that there is one, but we are just not in a posi­
tion to tell it. 
3D In summary, they are as follows: 
1) For an animal to perceive something, the "reception of sen­
sible forms is to be understood in terms ofbecoming aware of 
colors, sound, smells, and other sensible qualities, not just a 
physiological change in quality in the organ" (Burnyeat, 21-2) 
2) No physiological change is needed for the eye or the organ 
of touch to become aware ofthe appropriate perceptual objects. 
3) The Sorabji position is false, and what Aristotle really means 
by perception is the same as what Philoponus, Aquinas, and 
Brentano suggest. Rather than the eye literally becoming red, 
when trying to perceive it, the eye merely just becomes aware 
ofthe color. 
31 Ibid, 45. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, 52. 
34 David Tulkin 
34 Ibid, 53. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Kenny, 1984,86. 
38 Ibid, 82-3. 
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